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THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT OF
1978-THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
TO UNITED STATES v. MILLER: A
PROCEDURAL RIGHT TO CHALLENGE
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO FINANCIAL
RECORDS
Nancy M. Kirschner*

The question of whether customer records maintained by a
financial institution should be legally protected has been vigorously discussed, analyzed, and debated by legislators, judges,
bankers, law enforcement officials, educators, and privacy advocates since 1973. 1 Interaction with one's bank is "not entirely
volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life
of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account." 2
Thus, financial records are, in the words of Justice Douglas, a
"virtual biography." That is, a person is defined by the checks
he writes; banking transactions can indicate a person's "religion,
ideology, opinions, and interest. " 3
Such a biography, however, may be a dangerously inaccurate
reflection of an individual's life. One commentator cautions that
the information in an individual's checking account may actually
be a distorted mirror of his life. He stated, for example, that
the amount of money that passes through my liquor store
in my personal checks is no true reflection of the amount
of liquor I consume (because I often cash checks there) nor
is a check payable to a particular publisher evidence of my
reading tastes (I buy gift subscriptions for others and sub• Attorney at Law, San Francisco, California. Member of the California Bar. B.A.,
1970, Washington University, M.U.P., 1975, New York University; J.D., 1979, Rutgers
University-Newark.
1 The Safe Banking Act of 1977, H.R. 9086, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking
Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, 1449 (1977) (statement of Congressman St. Germain) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking
Act].
2 Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247, 529 P.2d 590,596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166,
172 (1974).
1 California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J ., dissenting).
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scribe to publications for professional not personal reasons)}
It was not surprising that in 1977 the congressionally created
Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) stated that in the
last ten years significant changes in technology and development
in social and economic systems have changed the relationships
between an individual, his financial institution, and the federal
government. Nor was it surprising to learn that the collection of
information about individuals enhances the government's authority and creates a danger of governmental abuse against which
the Constitution seeks to protect citizens. 5
Most Americans already knew that modern economic relationships are built on sophisticated systems involving third party
payments 8 and that records kept in connection with these third
party payments contained unprecedented detail about an individual. They were also aware that systems are automated so that
the most current detail on the individual is both readily available
and easily retrievable. What surprised many Americans was that
the government freely avails itself of this information without
notifying the person whose record it uses. Worse still, they
learned that the United States Supreme Court ruled in United
States v. Miller 1 that these records were the property of the financial institution and, thus, beyond the individual's control.
The transactional records which a checking account creates
today are ones which formerly would have been kept in the exclusive possession of the individual. These records would have existed a century ago in the form of receipts or-at most-ledger
entries. As long as the records remained in an individual's possession, the law recognized his right to control their use or disclosure,
and the government in particular was restricted in its ability to
gain access to them, even to facilitate a criminal prosecution. 8
Prior to computer banking, the bank returned cancelled checks
• Electronic Funds Transfer and Financial Privacy, S.2096, S.2293, S.1460, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1978) (statement of Robert Ellis Smith)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S. 1460).
• PRlvACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
3-4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL PmvACY REPoRT).
• The most typical example of third party payment is the personal check. The payor
draws a check on his bank to pay the payee and the bank pays on presentment.
' United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). For a brief discussion of Miller, see notes
52-59 and accompanying text infra.
• The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wanants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . . "
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to the customer and retained only a record of the amounts. The
monthly statement showed both the amounts and the dates. Once
the banks returned the checks they had no way of knowing to
whom those checks were paid or from where the deposits came,.
The bank's sole interest was in seeing that their books were balanced. Thus, the customer had in his possession the only copy of
his cancelled checks and law enforcement authorities needed a
search warrant to get them.
The Bank Secrecy Act9 and the Supreme Court's ruling in
United States v. Miller' 0 changed this state of affairs. The Bank
Secrecy Act, passed in 1970, was a well-intentioned effort to curb
white collar crime, federal tax evasion, and the practice of
"skimming." 11 It requires the institution to copy and to keep records of customer transactions. Under the Act, bankers are liable
for not reporting unusual cash transactions. To protect themselves, bankers began to record and maintain records of all types
of customer transactions.
In Miller, the Court ruled in favor of law enforcement needs in
the banking area by holding that a bank customer has no standing to contest government access to his bank records. 12 This decision came only two years after the California Supreme Court had
ruled in Burrows v. Superior Court 13 that financial records were
protected by the California Constitution, which is identical in
wording to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that a bank customer has a legitimate expectation of
confidentiality in those records.
Efforts to enact financial privacy legislation began in 1973 after
Miller held that the Bank Secrecy Act is constitutional. Support
for reform was sparked by frightening accounts of governmental
abuse of personal financial information made possible by the
compulsory record-keeping requirements of the Act. Daily reports
of Watergate, "black bag jobs," electronic surveillance, and
"enemies lists" broadened public awareness of the problem and
made such legislation politically feasible. Congressman Fortney
Stark, 14 a former banker, led the fight for financial privacy legislation. According to Stark, the Bank Secrecy Act created a tremen• 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-55 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1976).
10 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
11 "Skimming" is the practice of getting cash out of the gambling casinos and into secret
foreign bank accounts, thereby avoiding taxes.
12 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
1• 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
14 Congressman Fortney H. Stark was the unsuccessful depositor plaintiff in California
Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). For a discussion of Schultz, see notes 45-51
and accompanying text infra.
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dous threat to privacy, particularly in light of the fact that bankers and their customers have developed a tradition of confidentiality which customers expect their bankers to honor.1 5 With
institutions maintaining such records the individual loses control
over who might see or use them.1 8
In 1978, Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978 as Title XI of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and
Interest Control Act of 1978. 17 The Act creates a new concept for
the protection of citizens from certain governmental investigations which are not part of a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.
In effect, the Act tries to balance the needs of government against
the need for individual privacy. "A delicate balance must be
struck because the claims on both sides are legitimate." 18
The right to financial privacy goes to the heart of the tension
between an individual's right to conduct his business without
governmental intrusion and the government's legitimate need for
information in law enforcement. After enactment of the Bank
Secrecy Act, the issue was addressed in two forums-in the courts
and in Congress.
Balancing these needs is a difficult task at best. Indeed, it may
not be possible to achieve such a balance at all. Unforturiately,
Title XI does not meet the challenge. It appears to remedy the
consequences of Miller but, in fact, does not. This article will
review the factors leading to the Miller decision and the legislative response to that decision. Part I will examine the bank customer's expectation of privacy and the way Miller affects this
expectation. Part II will discuss the congressional response to
Miller and the competing interests which led to the Right to
Financial Privacy Act. The Act itself will be discussed in detail
in Part III. Part IV will evaluate the Act, and offer recommendations for reform. The article concludes that the Act, by adopting
a purely procedural approach, fails to provide adequate protection to bank customers.
15 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, at 1462 (statement of
Congressman Stark).
II Id.
" Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100-1122, 92 Stat. 3697-3710 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3401-3422).
•• H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE CONG.
& Ao. NEWS 9375 [hereinafter cited as Title XI: Right to Financial Priuacy-Legislatiue
History].
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GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO BANK RECORDS: A CUSTOMER
HAS NO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY

A.

Bank Records and the Customer's Expectation of
Confidentiality

The customer's communications with his bank have often been
characterized as "confidential." 19 Commercial bankers respect
this confidentiality and impose strict internal restrictions on information gathering and dissemination by their employees. Customers expect the bank to honor in good faith the trust entailed
by their relationship by refusing to disclose information concerning their financial affairs. There has, however, never developed a
"banker-customer privilege" similar to the attorney-client or
doctor-patient privilege. Bankers have never been legally privileged or immune from production of customer records. While
bank records may be "confidential," they cannot be described as
truly "private." The customer is concerned with the release of
information, not with the right of the bank to collect transactional information.
The few courts that have dealt with tl;ie bank-customer relationship have recognized a bank's duty of confidentiality. Several
courts found an implied contract which limited the bank from
disseminating information relating to a depositor's account except either upon the express or implied consent of the depositor
or in response to a valid court order or administrative summons. 211
As a result, bank records, though never accorded explicit constitutional protection, were analogized to "private papers" protected by the Fourth Amendment. 21 The rationale for finding such
a Fourth Amendment right had its origins· in Katz v. United
States. 22 Katz suggested that property interests would no longer
be the exclusive test of Fourth Amendment standing and that the
Fourth Amendment protects people as well as areas from unrea" Right to Financial Privacy Act, S. 1343, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976) (statements of A. A. Milligan, Harold R. Arthur, and Lucille M. Creamer)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 Senate Hearings on S. 1343). See also Le Valley & Laney, The
IRS Summons and the Duty of Confidentiality: A Hobson's Choice for Bankers, 89
BANKING L. J. 979 (1972); PERSONAL PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 101.
20 See Milohnich v. First Nat'! Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson
v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
21 See, e.g., Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652,542 P.2d 977,125
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1974); Milohnich v. First Nat'! Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
22
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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sonable searches and seizures.
Katz, however, did not address third party records and the
alternate holding of the case was that what a person knowingly
exposes to the public is not private and therefore is not entitled
constitutional protection. 23 Thus, a communication the confidentiality of which is dependent upon a person not revealing its content to a third party ordinarily lacks Fourth Amendment protec- ·
tion. 24 Cancelled checks are not considered to be confidential
communications and a bank customer would therefore lack
standing to contest an order to the bank for their production.
The information contained in bank records, however, including
where and how a person spends his money, could be considered
the property of the customer. The courts which found a duty of
confidentiality implied such a property right. 25 According to this
interpretation, the information was held by the bank but the
customer expected that the bank would not use it or convey it,
other than in the course of its contractual relationship, without
giving the customer notice of its release. Thus, the information
was not truly "private" since the customer realized and in fact
· expected his bank to release it under certain circumstances. The
customer, however, expected that he, not the bank, controlled the
decision of to whom such records should be released.

B.

The Bank Secrecy Act 26

In the late 1960's Congress became concerned with the unreported flow of currency into secret foreign bank accounts. Government investigators maintained that access to information contained in bank records was absolutely essential for effective law
enforcement. 27 Voluntary record maintenance by banks, however,
was frequently inadequate to provide the evidence sought by law
enforcement officials. Thus, in 1970, Congress enacted the Bank
Secrecy Act 28 authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to pre.. Id. at 351.
" See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749-52 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For a discussion of how this principle relates to the Miller decision
see United States v. Miller: Without a Right of Informational Privacy, Who Will Watch
the Watchers?, 10 J. MAR. J. PRACT. & PROC. 629, 637, 642-45 (1977). See generally
Comment, Government Access to Bank Records in the Aftermath of United States v.
Miller and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L. REV. 636 (1977).
11
See Milohnich v. First Nat'! Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson
v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
,. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-55 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1976).
27
1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 118 (statement of Richard L.
Thornburgh), 127 (statement of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.), & 128 (statement of Samuel K.
Skinner).
,. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-55 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§
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scribe regulations where he determines that the maintenance of
appropriate types of records and other evidence by banks has a
high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations and proceedings. 29 The regulations 30 enacted imposed
sweeping record-keeping and reporting requirements on domestic
banks. Banks were required to report major currency transactions
and extensions of credit; 31 to copy all checks (both front and back)
in excess of $100.00; 32 to keep copies for five years; 33 to set up
systems for tracing all large deposits for two years; 34 and to collect
signature cards, social security numbers, and names and addresses of each account holder. 35
The Bank Secrecy Act brought vigorous opposition. Bankers
objected to being put in an impossible position between the legitimate needs of the government and the customer's desire for confidentiality. 36 They also charged that the costs of the recording
requirements outweighed the law enforcement benefits and that
the regulations were unduly burdensome. 37
To many, the very idea of compulsory record-keeping threatened privacy, but Congress insisted that access to the records
would be controlled by existing legal process. 38 Floor debate prior
to enactment of the Act reveals that House members were under
the clear impression that government access to bank records
would be limited to enforceable subpoenas. 39 Even the Supreme
Court, in upholding the record-keeping requirements of the Bank
1051-1122 (1976).
" 31 u.s.c. § 1053 (1976).
30 Financial Recordkeeping & Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions, 31 CFR
Part 103 (1978).
31 Id. Operationally it was too expensive for banks to distinguish checks, and they
routinely microfilmed all checks. See generally 1976 Senate Hearings of S. 1343, supra note
19, for information on the way banks operated under the Bank Secrecy Act .
., 31 CFR § 103.34(b)(3) (1978).
13 31 CFR § 103.36(c) (1978) .
.. 31 CFR § 103.34 (1978) .
., Id.
31 See 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statements of A. A. Milligan &
Lucile M. Creamer).
1
•
Id.
31 The Senate Banking Committee Report on the Bank Secrecy Act states: "Access by
law enforcement officials to bank records required to be kept under this title would of
course be only pursuant to a subpoena or other lawful process as is presently the case.
The legislation in no way authorizes unlimited fishing expeditions on the part of law
enforcement officials." S. REP. No. 91-1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970). Similar language appears in the House Report: "It should be home in mind that records to be
maintained pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury will not be made
automatically available for law enforcement purposes. They can only be obtained through
existing legal process." H.R. REP. No. 91-975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
•• See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 16963-64 (1970).
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Secrecy Act, indicated that the Act was to be controlled by
"existing legal process. " 40

C.

Challenges to the Government's Right of Access to
Financial Records

The government's right of access to an individual's financial
records was challenged in California Bankers Association v.
Schultz, 41 United States v. Miller, 42 and Burrows v. Superior
Court 43 in which the customer plaintiffs asserted that they possessed an expectation of privacy in the information contained in
the records which would give them standing under the Fourth
Amendment to contest production of those records. Two courts,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the California
Supreme Court, reasoned that the information in bank records
made them confidential communications and that a customer
therefore had a right to receive notice of his bank's intention to
release the records and that he had standing to contest an order
served on the bank. The United States Supreme Court rejected
this theory in United States v. Miller" and adopted a traditional
possession analysis. The Court held in Miller that a customer has
no protectible interest in records held by a third party and thus
no standing to contest their release.
The first of the decisions concerning a depositor's right to contest release of his financial records by the bank arose in California
Bankers Association v. Schultz. 45 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act, stating that the maintenance
of detailed records pursuant to the Act did not violate a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights.
In Schultz, 46 several individual bank customers, a bank, the
California Bankers Association, and the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) brought an action against the Secretary of the
Treasury claiming that the Bank Secrecy Act and the regulations
enforcing the Act were violative of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Plaintiffs contended that when a bank maintains records under statutory and
regulatory compulsion it acts as a government agency and
thereby effects a "seizure" of customer records. The Court re"
"
"
"
"
"

California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974).
416 U.S. 21 (1974).
500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
425 U.S. 435 (1976). See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
416 U.S. 21 (1974).

"Id.
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jected the plaintiffs' argument, ruling that the mere maintenance
by the bank of records which can only be disclosed pursuant to
"existing legal process" is not an illegal search and seizure; the
bank, it held, is a party to the transaction and not a neutral
agent.47 The Court dismissed as "premature" the plaintiff depositor's claim that the Act's record-keeping requirements undermined his right to challenge a third party summons48 of his bank
records. 49
One commentator recognized that the issue _presented in
California Bankers was the point at which government seizure of
records occurs. 50 Under the Bank Secrecy Act, government access
to bank records involves a two-step procedure: first, the government requires the bank to copy customer checks, deposit slips,
and other documents and, second, it orders the bank to hand over
those records. California Bankers held that seizure does not occur
at the record-keeping phase because the government has not yet
acquired the records. When the government actually obtains the
records, the customer's Fourth Amendment challenge to the third
party summons is misplaced because the records are seized from
the bank rather than from the customer himself. In dissent, Justice Marshall said of the majority's decision: "[T]he majority
engages in a hollow charade whereby Fourth Amendment claims
are to be labeled premature until such time as they can be
deemed too late. " 51
The Court's decision left the "seizure" question undecided.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached this question
in United States v. Miller 52 when a bank customer challenged the
government's right of access to his bank records. Mitchell Miller
was indicted for various federal offenses in connection with the
operation of a still. Prior to the indictment, agents from the
Treasury presented grand jury subpoenas which were issued in
blank by a clerk of the district court and completed by the United
States Attorney's Office to the presidents of two banks where
Miller maintained accounts. The banks did not advise Miller that
the subpoenas had been served but ordered their employees to
make the records available and to provide copies of any documents the agents desired. The documents supplied included all
checks, deposit slips, two financial statements, and three
" Id. But see 416 U.S. at 95-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
•• A third party summons is a summons issued to a party other than the subject for
production of the subject's records.
" 416 U.S. 21, 56 (1974).
00 See Comment, supra note 24, at 640-41.
• 1 416 U.S. 21, 97 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974).
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monthly statements. Subsequent to the indictment, Miller made
a pre-trial motion to suppress the checks and bank records. He
alleged that the grand jury subpoenas served on the banks were
defective 53 and that the evidence was illegally seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 54
The district court denied the motion. The records were introduced and they helped to establish three overt acts against
Miller. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
Miller was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the use of a
defective subpoena to obtain copies of his bank records constituted an illegal search and seizure. 58 The court held that the
government could not circumvent Boyd v. United States 58 by
"first requiring a third party bank to copy all depositor's personal
checks and then, with an improper invocation of legal process,
call upon the bank to allow inspection and reproduction of these
copies. " 57 The court distinguished California Bankers on the
ground that the Supreme Court, far from "proclaiming open season on personal bank records," had relied on the fact that access
to the records was to be controlled by "existing legal process." 58
The subpoenas were thus defective and did not constitute adequate legal process. Since the rights of the depositor were threatened by the improper disclosure, the fact that bank officials cooperated voluntarily was deemed irrelevant. 59
In Burrows v. Superior Court, 80 the plaintiff, an attorney, was
suspected of misappropriating a client's funds. The police optained a warrant to search his office. After seizing a number of
documents, including check stubs, one of the detectives obtained
copies of Burrows' financial statements from plaintiffs bank. The
petitioner's motion to suppress those statements was denied and
u The subpoenas had been issued by the United States Attorney rather than a court,
no return was made to a court, and the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the
grand jury was not in session. Id. at 756-57.
"Id. at 756.
15
Id. at 758.
" 116 U.S. 161 (1886). In Boyd, glass importers were convicted of violating the customs
revenue laws by filing false invoices. Thirty-five cases of plate glass were seized and
confiscated. On appeal claimants maintained the invoice upon which the forfeiture judgment was based violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The United States Supreme
Court agreed and ruled that the seizure or compulsory production of a man's private
papers to be used against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against
himself. Thus, when the object of the search and seizure of a man's personal papers is to
compel him to be a witness against himself, the search and seizure itself violates the
Constitution.
" 500 F.2d 751, 757 (5th Cir. 1974).
11 Id.
"Id. at 758.

'°

13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).

20

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:1

he appealed. The California Supreme Court found a right of pri~
vacy protected by Article 1, § 13 of the California Constitution
and held that a depositor had a "reasonable expectation that the
bank would maintain the confidentiality of [his bank records] ."81 The court ruled that the police violated his (the depositor's) rights by obtaining these records without legal process. 62
The fact that the bank had a proprietary right to the records
was not dispositive since disclosure by the depositor to the bank
was made for the limited purpose of facilitating the conduct of
his financial affairs. Thus, his expectation of privacy was not
diminished by the bank's retention of a record of such disclosures
and the bank's voluntary relinquishment of depositor's records
did not constitute a valid consent by the depositor. 83 In a widely
cited passage the California Court commented:
[f]or all practical purposes the disclosures by individuals
. . . [is] not entirely volitional since it is impossible to
participate in the economic life of contemporary society
without maintaining a bank account. . . . To permit a
police officer access to these records merely upon his request without any judicial control as to relevancy or other
traditional requirement of legal process and to allow the
evidence to be used in any subsequent legal prosecution
against a defendant opens the door to a vast and unlimited
range of very real abuses of police power. 84
The following year the California Supreme Court extended
Burrows in Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 65 holding
that a customer's expectation of privacy in his bank records gave
him standing in a civil case to contest orders for their production. 88 The Court reasoned that the California Constitution protected a bank customer's right of privacy and that protection of
his right should not be left to the election of third persons who
may ha\'.e their own personal reasons for permitting or resisting
disclosure of confidential information received from others. 67
Therefore, the Court held that before confidential customer infor•• Id. at 243, 529 P.2d 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 169.
Id. at 245, 529 P.2d 594-95, 118 Cal. Rptr. 170-71. The California Court also stated
that "a bank customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to his bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal
banking purposes." Id. at 593.
13
Id. at 244-45, 529 P .2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
" Id. at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
•• 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
" Id. at 657-58, 542 P.2d at 979-80, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56.
17
Id. at 656-57, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
12
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mation may be disclosed, the bank must take reasonable steps to
notify its customers of the pendency and nature of the proceedings and to afford the customer a fair opportunity to assert his
own interest. 88 The result of this decision was not to bar access to
bank records; rather, it gave the bank customer a proprietary
interest in his bank records so that he could protect the confidentiality of those records.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Miller 89 and
held that a bank customer had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of checks and deposit slips. The Court reasoned that checks are not confidential communications but
merely negotiable instruments containing information which
Miller had voluntarily supplied the bank. 70 The Fourth Amendment, the Court stated, does not prohibit a third party from
obtaining information and turning it over to the government.
"The depositor takes the risk . . . that the information will be
conveyed . . . to the government. . . ." 71
Thus, the mere fact that the Bank Secrecy Act requires banks
to maintain detailed financial records of customer transactions
does not create a protectible interest in those records. The Court
found that "unlike the claimant in Boyd, respondent could assert
neither ownership nor possession [in the documents, 72 for] the
records are the business records of the bank. " 73
Under the Miller doctrine the bank had no legal obligation to
notify the customer of the government's request for information,
and, even if Miller had been notified, he would not have had
standing to contest their production. As one writer has explained,
"the Court's general conclusion that the defendant had no due
process rights whatever to object to his bank's disclosure of bank
records remained true even in view of [ California Bankers]. " 74
The Court found that a bank customer had no reasonable expectation of privacy as a matter of law and therefore as a matter of
law was not entitled to a vindication of rights he did not possess. 75
Thus, Miller put to rest any uncertainty concerning the government's access to bank records.
11 Id. at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
" 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
1
• Id. at 443.
"Id.
12 Id. at 442-43.
" Id.
" See Comment, A Bank Customer Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of Bank
Records: United States u. Miller, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 414, 432 (1977).
1
• Id.
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II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO MILLER:
PROCEDURAL RIGHT TO CHALLENGE GOVERNMENT ACCESS

Miller states in effect that the government is not bound by the
strictures of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when it wants to
acquire financial records held by a third party. By denying standing· to a customer whose records had been seized, the Court denied the customer the right to enforce compliance with legal process.78 John Shattuck, speaking on behalf of the ACLU, said,
"[W]hile [the Court] does not approve informal access 77 to
bank records, it refuses to recognize the only effective remedy to
curb such access-[ the] opportunity for the customer to protect
his . . . own rights." 78
Even before Miller, members of both houses of Congress recognized that the record-keeping requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act were being enforced in a manner Congress never intended. 79
Prompted by the availability of records maintained pursuant to
the Act, the number of requests for records increased dramatically. Informal access became a matter of course. 80 In fact, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigators were encouraged to meet
with and get to know banking officials to facilitate their investigations. 81 Bankers were under considerable pressure to comply with
the informal requests. Banking officials either failed to recognize
they had a right to refuse compliance or were unwilling to fight
access on behalf of a customer in the courts. 82
" PERSONAL PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 20.
77 Informal access is access without authorization by subpoena, warrant, or other judicial supervision.
" 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of John
Shattuck).
71 See generally Bank Failures, Regulatory Reform, Financial Privacy Hearings on H.R.
8024 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at
526-28 (statement of Congressman Edward Koch), & 543 (statement of Congressman
Fortney H. Stark) (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings on Bank Failures,
Regulatory Reform, Financial Privacy]; 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19,
at 39-42 (statement of Congressman Fortney H. Stark).
'° Id.
" INT. REv. MAN. § 937(12), MT 9300-49 (2/19/75); 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343,
supra note 19, at 165 (statement of Hope Eastman); interview with Harold J. Mortimer,
Vice President, First National State Bancorporation, Newark, New Jersey, April 3, 1979
[hereinafter cited as Mortimer Interview].
•• 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 165. See also Mortimer Interview,
supra note 82. See generally 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 44-112.
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Foundation for Financial Privacy Legislation

The Treasury Regulations83 implementing the Bank Secrecy
Act became effective in 1972, just as publicity was being given to
the government's abuses of personal privacy through domestic
surveillance, electronic eavesdropping, the existence of "enemies
lists," and manipulation of income tax investigations. Civil libertarians feared that individuals targeted for investigation for illegitimate reasons, such as political dissidence, might face additional exposure because of access to financial records.
Congress responded to public concern for financial privacy legislation in several ways. Between 1973 and 1978 no fewer than five
separate House and Senate subcommittees held hearings on the
issue. 84 In 1974, pursuant to section 5 of the Privacy Act, 85 Congress created the Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC)
to study the possibility of extending the principles of the Privacy
Act to private institutions. The Commission was directed to
study data banks, automatic, data processing programs, and information systems of governmental, regional, and private -organizations in prder to determine the standards and procedures in
force for personal protection of private information. The Commission's 650 page report, Personal Privacy in an Informational
Society, was submitted to the President and Congress on July 12,
1977. On the basis of the study, the Commission was asked to
report on such legislative recommendations as the Commission
might determine to be necessary to "protect the privacy of individuals while meeting the legitimate needs of government and
society for information. " 86
Coincidentally, Miller was decided as the Commission was conducting its initial hearings. Commissioners later said that Miller
underscored the lack of meaningful safeguards for the individual
when government seeks access to records about him. 87 The impli•• 31 CFR Part 103 (1978).
" Hearings were held in the 1975 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 8024, pts. 1, 2, 3 (i975);
the 1976 House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations House of
Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); the 1976 Senate Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States
Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. on S.1343 (1976); the 1977 House Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, House of Representatives, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 (1977); and the 1978 Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, United States ·senate, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978).
.
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1976). The Act limits the use and misuse of personal information
by the government.
·
., PERSONAL PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at xv.
" FINANCIAL PRIVACY 1979, A CAPITAL REPORTS, INC. COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, Washington
Credit Letter Privacy Report (ed.), Commentary by Milton W. Schober, Stephen M.
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cations of Miller "crystallized their thinking" 88 on the urgent need
for strong federal legislation to limit disclosures of information.
The law as it existed in 1977 gave the individual no leverage to
protect his privacy. The Commission urged strong corrective federal legislation whi~h would give a "legally enforceable expectation of confidentiality" in customer records. 89 This expectation of
privacy would have two complementary but distinct elements:
(1) an enforceable duty of the record-keeper which preserves the
record-keeper's ability to protect itself from improper actions by
the individual but otherwise restricts its discretion to disclose a
record about him voluntarily; and (2) a legal interest of the individual in his record which he can assert to protect himself against
improper or unreasonable demands for disclosure by the government. 90 At no time did the Commission recommend giving the
individual complete unilateral control of his financial records.
Another major congressional reaction to the government access
question was the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 91 which
raised tax returns to confidential status for the first time. In the
case of a third party summons, that Act gave taxpayers or other
persons to whom the summoned records pertain the right to receive notice of the summons from the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) within three days of issuance. It also gave standing to challenge enforcement of the summons. 92 The Act provided for reimbursement to the banks for the costs of searching, preparing,
reproducing, and transporting customer records and for the cost
of retaining counsel to review the sufficiency of their response to
the IRS request for customer records. 93
There is no evidence that the notice and standing requirements
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 have impeded either federal tax
collection or law enforcement efforts. Furthermore, bankers
maintained that the reimbursement requirement of the 1976 Act
had several positive effects. 94 First, it substantially decreased the
Szekely, Capitol Reports, Inc., Washington, D.C. at 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
FINANCIAL PRIVACY HANDBOOK] (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW
REFORM).

"Id.
" PERSONAL PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 20.

••
"
"
"

Id.
I.R.C. §§ 7609-7610.
Id. § 7609.
Id. § 7610. Richard Fischer, counsel for Crocker National Bank in California, testified

before a House subcommittee that "where they [IRS] were serving 150 to 200 summonses
a month, they are now serving 25." 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra
note 1, at 1514.
" 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, at 1488-1502 (statement
of Richard Fischer).
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number of requests for customer records. 95 Second, after the effective date of the statute, IRS summonses were drafted more precisely and were much narrower in scope. "The difference is," said
one commentator, that "someone is responsible for determining
how much value those records.actually have in a particular investigation. " 98

B. Impetus for Federal Financial Privacy Legislation:
The Recommendations of the Privacy Protection Study
Commission
While the Tax Reform Act of 1976 addressed the privacy concerns of bank customers in regard to IRS summonses, it left customers unprotected from all other government agencies. The
findings of the PPSC confirmed the fears of those who had suspected widespread government abuse of customer financial records. Not only was the customer often not notified of an investigation into his financial affairs, but even when he was, he was
unable to challenge access. Furthermore, once a government
agency obtained information from a third party record about an
individual, there was virtually no control of its circulation within
the government. After the PPSC study was released, Senator
Mathias said at the 1977 hearing, "Without such Congressional
action what recourse is there for someone who wants to keep his
financial records private? Is he to abandon the bank in favor of a
stuffed mattress?" 97
The Commission's approach to the government access issue
had four objectives: first, to fill the constitutional void that Miller
laid bare without unduly encumbering legitimate government
access to third party records about individuals; second, to provide
a strong safeguard for the individual in those record-keeping situations where they are demonstrably needed, i.e., where constitutional protections for individual liberty and autonomy have been
circumvented by changes in the character and technology of personal data record-keeping; third, to keep third party recordkeepers from being induced to hand over to the government voluntarily that which the government could otherwise obtain only
through compulsory legal process; and fourth, to avoid a course
of action that would delay and thus increase the cost of government access without affording the individual any new substantive
protections.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 1513-14.
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California law98 was the model for the Commission;s recommendations. It recognizes an individual's legitimate expectation
of privacy and thus provides a protectible interest99 in his bank
records. The Commission recognized that two issues had to be
addressed if federal legislation was to be as effective as the California law: first, "voluntary" disclosure of information by third
party record-keepers had to be limited by creation of a duty not
to disclose information about an individual except in certain explicit circumstances; and second, the individual had to be provided with a legally recognized interest that he could assert in
order to protect records about himself when government sought
to acquire them from a third party. 100
The Commission recommended creation of a "reasonable
cause" standard, a somewhat lower standard than the California
requirement of "probable cause." 101 The government agency requesting the record would have to establish reasonable cause to
believe the record was relevant to prosecution of a violation of
law. The Commission said that "[w]hile appreciating the efficiency arguments of law enforcement agencies, [it did] not believe that convenience alone should control policy judgments
when individual rights are at issue." 102

C.

Legislative Debate on Financial Privacy

The concept of a financial privacy act was introduced in 1973. 103
" California Governmental Access to Financial Records, CAL. Gov'T Coo&§§ 7460-7490
(Deering) (1976). The Commission read this statute as interpreted by the California Supreme Court in Burrows and Valley Bank to mean that government must show that
probable cause exists to compel production of bank records and that government may not
request and receive an individual's records without employing legal process unless the
customer consents. Personal Privacy Report, supra note 5, at 350-51 & 356-63. See 1978
Senate Hearings on S. 2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 593-612 (statement of privacy protection study commission submitted by Carole A. Parsons).
" See note 240 ancl accompanying text infra.
100 The Personal Privacy Report stated:
[W]ithout such a protectible interest in his records, an individual given notice,
standing, and the right to challenge a government request for his records would
have little basis for any real challenge, other than to snipe at the facial validity
of a summons or subpoena and to question government's adherence to the proper
procedural path. A grant of such procedural defense would not really recognize
the privacy interest of the individual . . . procedure alone gives the individual
no tool to protect himself.
Personal Privacy Report, supra note 5, at 352.
1• 1 Id. at 363.
102 Id. at 391.
103 1975 House Hearings on Bank Failures, Regulatory Reform, Financial Privacy, supra
note 79, at 543 (statement of Congressman Fortney H. Stark) & 526 (statement of Congressman Edward Koch). For a history of the legislation, see 1978 Senate Hearings on
S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4.
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Early advocates pushed for repeal of the Bank Secrecy Act and
adoption of strong federal legislation which would "establish a
policy without ambiguity that one's bank records are simply an
extension of one's personal papers protected by the Fourth
Amendment.'' 104 That is, the advocates urged that bank records
should not be released without a showing of probable cause to
believe a crime had been committed. 105
As the debate matured, the bills were revised and re-revised to
make the legislation politically more acceptable. Some bills exempted grand jury process while others exempted state and local
officials. Some provided procedural safeguards while others recognized a legally protected expectation of confidentiality. Bills
were introduced which included all third party records. Others
covered only bank records. The debate was heated and the lines
of support were sharply drawn.
Federal bank supervisory agencies generally supported the
principle of an individual's right to financial privacy as long as
that right did not inhibit the agencies' supervisory and enforcement functions. 108 Civil libertarians and bankers also endorsed
legislation to prohibit disclosure of customer financial records. 107
Civil libertarians believed that the Miller decision seriously
threatened First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights. rns They
urged passage of a statute that would guarantee the customer the
same interest in bank records as if those records were in his sole
possession.' 09 Such a statute would (1) prohibit informal access by
federal, state, and local government agencies; (2) provide a customer with timely notice of the proposed inspection; (3) provide
a mechanism for judicial review of government requests for financial records at which the customer would have full standing to
contest the relevancy, constitutionality, and legality of access;
and (4) create criminal and civil remedies, including damages
and return of all copies of improperly obtained bank records so
as to deter and punish violations of law.
In contrast to the civil libertarians, bankers did not advocate
a Fourth Amendment right in customer bank records. Their
'"' Id.
''" Senator Cranston acknowledged that this was the toughest position one could take
on the issue. 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 317.
'"' See, e.g., letter of George A. Le Maiste, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, reprinted in 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 415.
107
See 1976 Senate Hearings on S. 1343, supra note 19 (statement of Hope Eastman);
1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1 (statement of John Shattuck);
1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (statements of Robert Ellis Smith
& Jeremiah S. Gutman).
IOI Id.
'" Id.
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major concern was that under present law bankers were caught
between the legitimate needs of government seeking information
pertaining to illegal or criminal activities and the equally legitimate interest of bank customers who wanted them to protect
customer privacy,1 10 Bankers endorsed legislation which would
establish procedural safeguards and would shift liability for improper disclosure and the costs of compliance from the financial
institution to the government. 111
The strongest opposition to any financial privacy legislation
came from state and federal law enforcement agencies. Financial
records had become a precious tool for all law enforcement officers. State and local officials were successful in having state agencies exempted from many of the legislative proposals. They
argued that a uniform national policy would not only violate federalism but would also be counterproductive because there were
significant differences between federal and state criminal justice
systems. 112 Only a state legislature, they claimed, was in a position to design procedures for disclosure which would "fit" with
the investigatory and subpoena powers available to law enforcement officials in a particular state,1 13
Prior to 1977, federal law enforcement officials steadfastly opposed any financial privacy legislation. Officials of the Departments of Justice and the Treasury maintained that there was no
privacy interest, constitutional or otherwise, of sufficient scope to
support any restrictions on governmental access to financial records.'"
The law enforcement officials believed the procedural safeguards of notice and standing to contest access would give criminals sufficient time to flee or to destroy evidence. 115 Of greatest
concern to the Justice Department were provisions dealing with
restrictions on access of federal grand juries to financial records.
They attacked provisions which would give customers notice
11
• 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statements of A.A. Milligan & Lucille
Creamer); 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1 (statement of
Richard Fischer & Morris F. Miller); 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note
4 (statement of American Bankers Association).
Ill Id.
112
See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings on S. 1343, supra note 19 (statement of Peter Zimroth); 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (statement of Thomas D.
Rath).
113 Id.
'" As one federal official stated: "[T]he privacy interest . . . is far outweighed by the
critical need of the government for such records in the legitimate pursuit of white collar
and organized crime and official corruption.'' 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note
19, at 118 (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh).
'" See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings on S. 1343, supra note 19 (statements of Richard L.
Thornburgh, Robert B. Fiske, Jr., & Samuel K. Skinner).

FALL

1979]

Financial Privacy Act

29

and standing to challenge the grand jury's access to third party
records and which would place restrictions on the use of financial
records "for any purpose other than the specific statutory purpose
for which the information was originally obtained." 118
Testifying on behalf of the 94 U.S. Attorneys, Samuel K. Skinner, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, said that,
if enacted, the Act would seriously hamper the government's ability to detect and prosecute white collar crime and other crimes
involving concealment of financial transactions. 117 The U.S. Attorneys had four objections: (1) the Act would unduly delay investigations; (2) it would destroy secrecy and the ability of the
U.S. Attorney's office to get witnesses to cooperate; (3) disclosure
would permit subornation of perjury; and (4) it would create the
risk of privacy which would be counterproductive to the privacy
interests of grand jury witnesses. 118
Until 1977 the Departments of Justice and the Treasury were
successful in keeping financial privacy legislation in the congressional subcommittees. But, in June 1977, Congressman John
Cavanaugh, junior member of the House Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, introduced a bill with both Democratic and Republican co-sponsors. 118 The bill conformed very
closely to the Privacy Protection Study Commission's report, and
was based on the same two key principles: that the customer be
given prior notice of the government's attempt to gain access to
ba_nk records and that the customer be given the opportunity to
contest government access in court. 120 Cavanaugh was successful
in having the bill added to the massive bank regulatory bill pending in the Banking Committee's Financial Institution's Subcommittee.121
The Cavanaugh bill was substantially different from previous
privacy bills. The legislation went through an evolutionary process to address the objections of law enforcement officials. In the
beginning the subcommittee members believed that there was a
constitutional right to financial privacy and that any intrusion
should be based on the standard of probable cause that a crime
had been committed. 122 The bill allowed an intrusion with a stanId.
1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statement of Samuel K. Skinner).
118
Id.
'" Title XI: The Right to Financial Privacy-Legislative History, supra note 18, at
9306.
'" Id.
111 Id.
112
See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 39-44 (statement of
Congressman Fortney H. Stark); 1975 House Hearings on Bank Failures, Regulatory Reform, Financial Privacy, supra note 79, at 564 (statement of Congressman Edward Koch).
Ill

117
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dard for seeking information "relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry" 123-a standard substantially below the probable cause standard.
While spokesmen for the Justice Department still warned that
notice and standing would impede investigations, they took no
position on the Cavanaugh bill. When it was clear that there was
solid bipartisan support for the Financial Privacy bill, the Justice
and Treasury Departments introduced their own proposal which
gave customers a well-defined statutory right of privacy. Yet substantial differences between the Justice-Treasury draft bill and
the Cavanaugh bill blocked any compromise between the House
subcommittee and the Administration. 124
As the legislative history reveals however, when it became apparent that the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest
Control Act of 1978 had a good chance of passage, the Departments of Justice and of the Treasury lobbied intensively in an
eleventh hour effort to make substantial changes. 125 These
changes were embraced in the so-called Cavanaugh-LaFalce substitute bill. The substitute was offered to the full House committee and was rewritten in the course of a morning's work. 128 Controversy over the substitute focused on three areas: (1) whether the
title should apply to grand jury process; (2) which party should
be required to go to court first to challenge the release of financial
records; and (3) when notification should be provided to the party
whose financial records are being sought. 127
The compromise amendments tightened and clarified the proposal. Cavanaugh's bill as finally reported out of the full committee provided for "prior notification" to the customer of the expected release of records and standing to challenge the release in
court. 128 At the urging of the Justice Department, a "healthy set
of exceptions" to the prior notification requirement was carved
out. 129
The compromises that were worked out substantially weakened
the protections the Privacy Commission considered essential. A
customer was not given a protectible interest in his financial records; instead, he was given a procedural right to challenge their
12 U.S.C.A. §. 3401(7) (1978).
"' Officials of the Departments of Justice and of the Treasury threatened to recommend
presidential veto if their proposal was not adopted. FINANCIAL PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra
note 87, at 12.
123 Jd.
iu Title XI: The Right to Financial Privacy-Legislative History, supra note 18, at
9374.
i21 Id.
iu Id.
in Id.
123
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release on the grounds that the records sought were not relevant
to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry or that there had not
been substantial compliance with the provisions of the Act. The
customer had the burden of going forward; the government had
the burden of proof. Congressman McKinney argued that the
average citizen would now be faced with "a condition of taking
on the whole U.S. Government. . . . " 130
While the committee recognized that grand jury practices
needed reform, they were persuaded that "the Banking Committee was not the place to do it." 131 Grand jury procedures were
completely exempted from the notice and standing provisions of
the final Act.
The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 132 Title XI of the Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
was enacted in the last days of the 1978 congressional session. The
Act was signed on November 10, 1978, and became effective
March 10, 1979.
Subsequent to passage, but prior to the Act's effective date,
Congress voted to repeal the summary notification provision. 133
That provision would have required every creditor and financial
institution to give all past and present customers with both active
and dormant accounts a one-time summary notification of customer rights. •:u Not until the new Act was passed did the financial
industry estimate that the cost of such compliance would approach one billion dollars. The estimates showed that some 75
million households would receive an average of twelve separate
notices under the Act "at a time when [a customer] would have
little or no use for it. " 135 Congress reevaluated the provision and
found that since the Act required a government agency to give
notice when it seeks access to specific records, an individual
would not be damaged by repeal of the summary notice provision.138
,,. H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 237, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9367 [hereinafter cited as H-R. REP. No. 95-1383].
111 Title XI: The Right to Financial Privacy-Legislative History, supra note 18, at
9376.
m 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (1978).
,u House-S.37 Repeal of Section 1104(d) of Pub. L. No. 95-630, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REc. H902, 906-07 (daily ed. February 27, 1979) ..
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404(d) (1978).
,u House-S.37 Repeal of Section 1104(d) of Pub. L. No. 95-630, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CoNG. REc. H902, 904 (daily ed. February Tl, 1979).

,,. Id.
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Overview of the Act's Provisions

The Act prohibits federal agencies from obtaining access from
a financial institution to· records concerning customers except
through procedures set forth in the law. The term "financial institutions" includes all banking-type institutions as well as credit
card issuers and consumer finance agencies. 137 "Customers" are
limited to individuals or partnerships of five or fewer individuals. 138 Corporations, associations, larger partnerships, or other
entities are not covered. "Financial records" means any original,
copy of, or "information known to be derived from" a record
pertaining to a customer's relationship with a financial institution.139 Financial records or information not identifiable with a
particular customer are excepted, as is basic account information. 140 The "information known to be derived from" language was
inserted to prevent conscious circumvention of the Act. 141
Under the Act, federal authorities may obtain access to a customer's financial records only in connection with a "legitimate
law enforcement inquiry. "u 2 This is a new concept which is
broadly defined as "a lawful investigation or official proceeding
inquiring into a violation of, or failure to comply with, any criminal or civil statute or any regulation, rule or order issued pursuant
thereto." 143 The statute as passed differs substantially from prior
proposals which contemplated a much stronger showing as a prerequisite to obtaining the records of the financial institution. The
"legitimate law enforcement inquiry" concept "seeks· to afford
protection against obtaining individuals' financial records for
improper purposes, without interposing a barrier to effective law
enforcement. " 144
B.

Procedures for Access

Access to financial records is prohibited unless either permitted
by one of the exceptions to the Act, e.g., grand jury subpoena or
12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(1) (1978).
12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(4)-(5) (1978).
ISi 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(2) (1978).
"" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(g) (1978).
"' The definition of financial records applies not only to written records but to oral
disclosures of information known to have come from financial records. FINANCIAL PRIVACY
HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 19.
"' 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405(1), 3407(1), 3408(3), 3409(a)(2) (1978).
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(7) (1978).
"' Givens, The Law on the Right to Financial Privacy, 181 N.Y.L.J. 2 (1979).
IST
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procedures; 145 customer authorization, 148 administrative summons
or subpoena, 147 search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 148 judicial subpoena, 148 or "formal written requests," where no administrative summons or subpoena authority reasonably appears available. 150
Under the customer authorization provision, customers may
authorize access to identified records by giving written approval
for a period of no more than three months. Such authorization is
revocable at any time before the records are disclosed. 151 The
financial institution is required to keep records of the agencies to
which customer authorization is granted.' 52 The Act does not
specify who is required to give the financial institution the authorization, i.e., whether the customer himself must give written
authorization to the institution or whether government officials
may simply submit proof of authorization.
Current law governing search warrants is not changed, but the
government must notify the customer of the search within ninety
days after execution of the warrant unless a court ordered delay
is obtained pursuant to the federal statute. 153 Judicial and administrative summonses and subpoenas are judicially enforceable
government demands for records authorized by some other provision of law. m Grand jury subpoenas are excepted. 155 The "formal
written request" 158 is a new procedure which has been severely
criticized. It is designed to allow governmental authorities which
do not have authority to issue administrative summonses or subpoenas, e.g., the FBI and the U.S. Attorney, to request records
formally. This provision is intended to replace the former practice
of informal access with a procedure which includes notice and
challenge rights. Unlike the administrative process, a formal
written request is a noncoercive form of process and the financial
institution may refuse compliance.
Before records are obtained, a supervisory official of the government authority must certify to the financial institution that the
authority has complied with all applicable provisions of the
""
"'
"'
""
"'
''"
1• 1

'"'
,,.
'"'
,..
,..

12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12

U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.

§ 3420 (1978).
§ 3404 (1978).
§ 3405 (1978).
§ 3406 (1978).
§ 3407 (1978).
§ 3408 (1978).
§ 3404(a)(2) (1978).
§ 3404(c) (1978).
§ 3406 (1978).
§§ 3405, 3407 (1978).
§ 3420 (1978).
§ 3408 (1978).
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Act. 157 Financial institutions and their employees are absolved
from civil liability for any improper disclosure if such disclosure
was based on good faith reliance of the certificate. 158 The three
forms of process, administrative, judicial subpoena, and formal
written request, require that unless a delay of notice order is
obtained, the government agency seeking the record must notify
the customer and give him the following: (1) a description of the
records being sought; (2) a statement of the general purpose of the
inquiry; and (3) an explanation of the procedure by which a customer may challenge access in court. 159 The government must
provide the customer with a copy of the process, a blank motion,
and affidavit forms for filing in court. 180 The appropriate court in
which a customer challenge may be filed must be listed in the
notice. 181 Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) for administrative process and formal written requests and by 12 U.S.C. §
3410(a) for judicial subpoenas. 182

C.

Customer Challenges

Within ten days of service or fourteen days following mailing
(not receipt) of customer notice, the customer may file a motion
seeking to prevent access. 183 To prevail, a customer must show
that there is reason to believe that the records sought are not
relevant to any "legitimate law enforcement inquiry" or that
there has not been "substantial compliance" with the Act. The
mere filing of a customer challenge action precludes governmental access to financial records until the matter is finally adjudicated.184
If the court finds that the required showing has been made, the
government bears the burden of proving it is entitled to access. 185
It must show merely that there is reason to believe that the records sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry
within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency . 188 The test for
relevance is broad and encompasses anything that might be used
as evidence or might lead to evidence. Put simply, the govern117

12 U.S.C.A. § 3403(b) (1978).
,.. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(c) (1978).
"' 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405(2), 3406(b)-(c), 3407(2) (1978).

"" Id.
Ill Id.
11
• 12 U.S.C.A. § 3416 (1978). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976); 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a)
(1978).
,u 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978).
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(c) (1978).
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(b)-(c) (1978).
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ment need show only that the investigation is not "conducted
solely for the purposes of political harassment or intimidation or
otherwise in bad faith." 187 The "substantial compliance" language is intended to insure that minor technical violations of the
Act are not the basis for denial of access. 188
The government's showing may be submitted solely to the
court and not the customer if reasons are given which make such
in camera review appropriate. 189 Factors meriting in camera review might include the same circumstances that justify the delay
of notice, namely, danger to life or safety of any person; flight
from prosecution; destruction of or tampering with evidence; and .
intimidation of potential witnesses or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or official proceeding or unduly delaying
a trial or ongoing official proceeding. 170 Justice Department officials and subcommittee members agreed that the phrase "seriously jeopardize an investigation or trial" is to be read narrowly
and that it refers to circumstances which might reveal the identity of the target of the investigation (if the target was not the
customer), the identity of an informant, or which might result in
improper discovery by the defendant.
The Act recognizes the need to expedite customer challenges:
all challenge proceedings are to be decided within seven calendar
days of the filing of the agency's response. 171 Denials of challenges
are not final orders and no interlocutory appeals are permitted. 172
Subsequent appeals from a challenge ruling may be brought as
part of an appeal. 173 Because of the restriction on interlocutory
appeals, the agency must notify the customer of a final order on
any legal proceedings brought against him based on the records
or it must advise him that no legal proceeding against him is
contemplated. 174 The effect of an appeal after access is already
accomplished, however, is unclear.
The judicial remedies set forth in the Act are expressly stated
to be exclusive, 175 and a customer is limited to challenges based
on relevance and the agency's lack of substantial compliance with
the procedural requirements of the Act. 178 The customer is prohib117
See 124 CONG. REC. Hll,737 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (statement of Representative
Edward Pattison).
118
H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, supra note 130, at 9355 (Section-by-Section Analysis).
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(b) (1978).
11
• 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409(a)(3) (1978).
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(b) (1978).
172
12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(d) (1978).
"' Id.
"' Id.
111
12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(e) (1978).
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(e)-(O. See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978).
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ited from asserting any defenses of the financial institution. 177 For
example, the customer may not object to access on the grounds
that the request is overbroad, vague, or unduly burdensome. 178

D.

Duties of the Financial Institution

Financial institutions are obligated to assemble the records
requested even during the pendency of the customer challenge
proceedings. 178 They are permitted reimbursement for the costs
incurred in complying with the government's requests for the
records. 180 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
is to establish a fee schedule to cover "reasonably necessary costs
which have been directly incurred in searching for, reproducing
or transporting . . . " the data required.' 81

E.

Use and Transfer of Information

The Act sets new restrictions upon the transfer of financial
records between federal departments and agencies. 182 Financial
records may be transferred only after an official of the transferring agency certifies in writing that there is reason to believe that
the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry
of a receiving agency.' 83 Within fourteen days after any transfer,
the customer must be notified unless in connection with the original access or at the time of the transfer the government has obtained a court-ordered delay pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3409.'M
These transfer restrictions apply to any inter-agency transfer;
departmental transfers (e.g., FBI to the U.S. Attorney, within the
Justice Department) are permitted without post-notification. 185
Subsequent use of the information, however, is governed by the
statute. 1118 Notification to the customer that copies of or information contained in his financial records are furnished to other governmental agencies is required for transfers between federal departments; it does not restrict transfers to or from state and local
officials. 187
m
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Exceptions

The legislative history accompanying the Act reports that "any
fears of unnecessary governmental restriction should be put to
rest by the healthy set of exceptions that have been carved out
in the Act. " 188 Indeed, some critics charged that the exceptions
render the Act nearly nugatory . 189 There are both exceptions 190
and exemptions. 191 Some of the exemptions are standing procedures, and financial institutions are expected to be aware of them
and honor them. In other cases, government officials must present a compliance certificate to the institution certifying that the
information is being sought in compliance with the law.
1. Grand Jury Exception-The single most important exception is the exception for federal grand jury subpoenas. 192 Section
3420 requires that financial records obtained by grand jury subpoena shall be "returned and actually presented" to the grand
jury. 193 The records must be destroyed or returned to the financial
institution if not used in connection with the return of an indictment, a criminal prosecution, or a purpose permitted by Rule 6(e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 194 governing secrecy
and disclosure in grand jury proceedings. Financial records subpoenaed by a grand jury must be kept separate from other grand
jury materials and used only in connection with obtaining an
indictment, prosecution of the indicted offense, or a purpose authorized by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.195
2. Litigation Exception-The Act does not apply when records are sought through the Federal Rules of Criminal or Civil
Procedure, or in connection with any judicial or administrative
proceeding to which the customer and the government authority
are parties. 198 Thus, even when the customer is a plaintiff against
118

Title XI: The Right to Financial Privacy Act-Legislative History, supra note 18, at

9375.
111
See 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 581 (statement of
Jeremiah S. Gutman), 587 (statement of David Linowes), & 613 (statement of Robert Ellis
Smith). See also Palmer & Palmer, Complying with the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1978, 96 BANKING L. J. at 196-98 (1979).
1
'° Exceptions are instances where the normal procedures controlling government access
are either wholly or partially inapplicable. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3413, 3414, 3420 (1978).
111
Exemptions are instances where the Act's provisions controlling government access
do not apply. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission is exempt from the
provisions of the Act for a period of two years. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3422 (1978).
111
12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (1978).
113
12 U.S.C.A. § 3420(1) (1978).
IN 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420(4) (1978).
115
12 U.S.C.A. § 3420(2) (1978).
IN 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(e)-(O (1978).
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the government, financial records in the possession of federal
agencies may be obtained without prior notice.
3. Account Identification Information Exception-In certain
specified instances, government officials are allowed, without
notice to the indvidual, to obtain and transfer basic account identification information for a specific customer or an ascertainable
group of customers. 197 More specific inquiries are permitted as to
an account number associated with a particular financial transaction, e.g., a check forgery or a class of transactions, as well as
of accounts associated with a foreign country .1 98
4. Foreign Intelligence and Secret Service Protective Function Exception-The notification provisions of the Act do not
apply to those government authorities authorized to conduct foreign intelligence or Secret Service activities. 199 These officials are
only required to certify to the financial institution that they have
complied with the applicable provisions of the Act, 200 and the
financial institution is prohibited from disclosing to the customer
that such an investigation is being conducted. 201 The Act requires
government investigators to compile an annual tabulation of the
occasions in which this exception was used. 202
5. Emergency Access Exception-Government access to financial records is not restricted by the Act in narrowly defined
emergency situations where delay would create imminent danger
of physical injury, serious property damage, or flight from prosecution. 203 Such records may be obtained only upon presentation
of a certificate of compliance. 204 Within five days of access, the
government must file in court a statement by the supervisory
official justifying use of the emergency access provision. 205 Unless
a court order delaying notice is obtained, the agency must notify
the customer of the access as soon as is practicable. 208
6. Disclosures by Financial Institutions-Institutions are permitted to notify the government of possible violations of law. 207
They may not turn over records but may give sufficient account
identification information, dates of transactions in question, and
117

12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(g) (1978).

118
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such other information as to enable government officials to investigate the suspected offense. 208
7. Where a Financial Institution Is a Target-Where the institution is a target of an investigation, the government is allowed
access to financial records without notice to the customer whose
record is requested. 209 Such a customer record may not be used
against the customer unless the regular access provisions of the
Act are first employed. 210 The government must serve a certificate
of compliance on the institution before records may be obtained
through this exception. 211
8. Bank Supervisory Agency Exception-The following agencies are listed as "supervisory agencies": the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the National
Credit Union Administration, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Secretary of the Treasury
(with respect to the Bank Secrecy Act), and any state banking or
securities agency or department. 212 These agencies have free access to financial records when they are performing supervisory
functions 213 and they are permitted to exchange examination reports and other information with each other. 214
9. General Accounting Office (GAO) Exception-The GAO is
excepted under 12 U.S.C. § 3413(j).
10: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Exception-Administrative summonses issued by the IRS are also excepted. 215
These summonses are covered by IRC § 7609.
11. Required Report Exception-Financial information required to be reported by statute or regulation (e.g., Bank Secrecy
Act compulsory reporting requirements) is excepted and may not
be withheld by the financial institution. 218
12. Financial Records Pertinent to Federally Insured Guaranteed Loans Exception-The Act excepts agencies which administer federal loan programs from the notice and challenge provisions where customers are recipients of government loans and the
12
zoo 12
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211 12
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213 12
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211
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§ 3413(g) (1978).
§ 3413(h)(l)(A) (1978).

§ 3402 (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3413(h)(l)(A), (h)(4) (1978).
§ 3413(h)(2) (1978).
§ 3401(6) (1978).
§ 3413(b) (1978).
§ 3412(d) (1978).
§ 3413(c) (1978).
§ 3413(d) (1978).
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records pertain to the administration of those loans. 217 Before obtaining such customer records, the government agency must certify compliance to the bank218 and the bank must keep a record
of all instances in which such access was granted. 219

13. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Exemption-The SEC is expressly exempted from the Act until
November 10, 1980. 220
G.

Remedies

Government agencies and financial institutions are liable to
customers for damages sustained due to violations of the Act. 221
Recovery is one hundred dollars minimum damages for each violation regardless of the volume of records involved. 222 That means
that if a financial institution improperly discloses customer records on two occasions, the institution is liable for a minimum of
two hundred dollars• even if each violation involved several
hundred documents. In addition to the minimum damages, the
Act provides for actual damages, 223 punitive damages, 224 and reasonable attorney's fees 225 for the successful customer plaintiff.
Injunctive relief is also authorized. 228
Financial institutions and their employees and agents are absolved from liability for acting upon the good faith reliance of a
government certificate of compliance. 227 There is no liability of
individual government officials for damages, but the Civil Service
Commission is authorized to determine whether disciplinary proceedings are warranted for willful violations of the Act, and the
administrative authority is required to take the corrective action
recommended by the Civil Service Commission. 228

H.

Reporting Requirements

The Act establishes various reporting requirements. The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is
m 12 U.S.C.A.
zu 12 U.S.C.A.
211 12 U.S.C.A.
220 12 U.S.C.A.
221 12 U.S.C.A.
222 12 U.S.C.A.
223 12 U.S.C.A.
22• 12 U.S.C.A.
m 12 U.S.C.A.
m 12 U.S.C.A.
227 12 U.S.C.A.
228 12 U.S.C.A.
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required to file an annual report of the number of applications for
delays and customer challenges made in the preceding year. 229
The report, which must be filed with the appropriate congressional committees, must include the identity of the government
authority requesting a delay of notice, the number of notice delays sought, and the number granted. 230 In addition, the government authority that requests access under the Act must report to
Congress the number of requests for access made during the preceding year. 231

N.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
OF Tm: Acr

In evaluating the Act, it is important to keep in mind why it
was enacted. Advocates of financial privacy legislation sought to
achieve several objectives: to fill the void created by United
States u. Miller 232 without unduly encumbering legitimate government access to third party records about individuals; to provide strong safeguards for the individual in a record-keeping situation where the constitutional protection for individual liberty
and autonomy have been circumvented by changes in the character and technology of financial data record-keeping; to create a
system which would provide a "paper trail" to identify by whom,
why, and by what authority an individual's records have been
examined; to keep third party record-keepers from being induced
to voluntarily furnish the government what it could otherwise
obtain only through compulsory legal process; and to avoid a
course of action that would delay and thus increase the cost of
government access without affording the individual any new substantive protections. 233 Unfortunately, the Act does not meet
these objectives.
As the legislative history reveals, Title XI is a decidedly progovernment statute which fails to give customers adequate privacy protection. 234 What is required is a better balance between
the three separate interests affected by the Act, namely, those of
the customer, those of the financial institution, and those of govm 12 U.S.C.A. § 3421(a) (1978) .
... Id.
131 12 U.S.C.A. § 3421(b) (1978).
132 425 U.S. 435 (1976). For a discussion of Miller, see notes 69-75 and accompanying
text supra.
m 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 602 (statement of Privacy
Protection Study Commission submitted by Carole W. Parsons on "The Recommendations of the Privacy Protection Study Commission"), & 149 (joint statement of Congressmen Ned Pattison and Barry M. Goldwater).
"' See notes 119-31 and accompanying text supra.
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ernment law enforcement officials.
The 1978 Act is really a modified version of the JusticeTreasury proposal. New substantive rights advocated by the Privacy Protection Study Commission were replaced by a procedural
right to challenge the relevancy of the records sought to the law
enforcement "inquiry," and the government's "substantial" compliance in seeking access. Some Congressmen charged that the
compromise was one-sided. 235 Commentators in the financial industry and advocates of personal privacy called the Act a decidedly pro-government statute. 238
Thus, it is not surprising that the Act fails to give customers
adequate protection. Nor is it surprising that the provisions
which affect the financial institutions subject those institutions
to civil liability and impose additional record-keeping requirements on them. Such compromises were required by the Department of Justice and the Treasury. Without them, say supporters,
the Act would not have been passed. 237
If the fundamental purpose of the Act is to permit customers
to challenge the government's access when their records are
sought for improper or illegitimate reasons, the critical question
is whether this can be accomplished in the face of the procedures
established to protect those legitimate investigations. 238 The former chairperson of the PPSC warned Congress that rejection of
the PPSC's recommendations and adoption of the Justice proposal would seriously threaten individual privacy. 239 The Act as
passed does not insure the customer with the Commission's recommended "legal expectation of confidentiality" in his financial
records. 240 A citizen whose privacy has been violated by improper
access to his records has no inherent right of privacy ori which to
base a cause of action. 241 By failing to create a private right of
action for the individual whose financial records are sought by the
111
H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, supra note 130, at 9366-67 (additional remarks of Congressman Stewart B. McKinney).
131
See generally 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (additional
statements).
111
See notes 119-31 and accompanying text supra.
131 Givens, supra note 144, et 2.
131
1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, et 588 (additional statement
of David L. Linowes).
uo In the 1977 House hearings on the Safe Banking Act, Senator Charles Mathies
advocated the individual be given a proprietary right in personal records held by e third
party. The Commission hes celled this proprietary right en individual's "protectible interest" in his personal records. 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1,
at 1515.
241
See generally 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (comments by
David L. Linowes, Carole W. Persons, & Jeremiah S. Gutman on the compromise version
of the S.2096 financial privacy bill).
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government, the bill fails to incorporate the essential element of
the legal mechanism which the Commission believed essential. 242
Without this right of action no citizen can be certain that his
personal privacy interests will be fairly weighed against the government's need for information about him. 243 Unquestionably, the
failure to insure a legal expectation of confidentiality in an individual's financial records is the most serious defect of the Act.
Moreover, the limited protection afforded individual customers
under the Act is denied other bank customers. Protection is limited to individuals and partnerships of five or fewer individuals
who utilized or are utilizing a financial service. 244 Earlier versions
of the legislation protected all customers, i.e., individuals, partnerships, corporations, trusts, and other legal entities. 245 It is unreasonable to cut off the rights provided by Title XI on the basis
of the number of individuals in a partnership or on the form
which a group of individuals chooses for its business. 248 Clearly,
the definition of "customer" 247 should be broadened to include all
customers. Furthermore, the term should likewise apply to any
person "who has applied" to utilize a financial service.
Several other safeguards the PPSC believed essential were
amended out of the Act and some provisions which the PPSC
warned were dangerous to privacy protection were incorporated
into the compromise bill. 248 Specifically, the three provisions of
"' Id.
'" 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 593-94 (statement submitted by Carole W. Parsons).
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(4)-(5) (1978).
,.. Letter of Leland S. Prussia, Vice Chairman and Cashier, Bank of America, to Congressman Harold J. Johnson, re: H.R. 13471-The Financial Institutions and Regulatory
Act of 1978, dated September 12, 1978, attachment A, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Prussia
letter] (letter on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM).
"' Id.
"' A "customer" is defined by the Act as "any person or authorized representative of
that person who utilized or is utilizing any service of a financial institution, or for whom
a financial institution is acting or has acted as a fiduciary, in relation to an account
maintained in the person's name." 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(5) (1978).
"" Specifically, the Privacy Protection Study Commission was concerned about the
following provisions:
[G]rand jury subpoena, whose use as an investigative tool has been extended
considerably over the years, is exempt totally from the Justice Department's bill.
That is, there is no requirement for notice, no standard for issuance, no opportunity to challenge its validity, and no procedure for reporting the number or nature
or these subpoenas.
The standard under which government agencies are authorized to issue an
administrative subpoena or summons, or court subpoena-"relevant to a legitimate law enforcement purpose"-is not sufficiently well-defined to inform the
record subject of the nature of his alleged misconduct. There is no requirement
that the records in question be described in the subpoena or summons.
The Act enables government agencies that do not have statutory ability to issue
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Title XI which drew the strongest criticism from the PPSC and
civil libertarians 249 were: (1) the exception of grand jury subpoenas;250 (2) the institutionalization of informal access through
the formal written request; 251 and (3) the customer challenge provisions. 252
The exemption of the grand jury from the Act 253 is perhaps the
most serious omission. From the outset, the question of whether
to make grand jury process subject to the notice and standing
requirements stirred great controversy. Law enforcement officials
who fought vehemently for the grand jury exclusion argued
throughout the hearings that the grand jury is the single most
effective investigative tool in criminal law enforcement and that
nothing should impede grand jury investigations. They maintained that grand jury practices were subject to judicial oversight
administrative subpoenas or summonses to acquire this authority by internally
promulgated regulations. This broad grant of authority to administrators could
be a subversion of the subpoena or summons requirement. H Congress considers
that an agency should have powers of compulsory process, it would grant those
powers. [T]he standard of relevance to a legitimate law enforcement purpose-loose as it is-would not even be reviewable by an independent judicial
body prior to its issuance.
The criteria for delaying notice to a bank customer that his records are being
subpoenaed include a catch-all type of provision-"otherwise jeopardizing an
investigation or official proceeding"-that could virtually negate the requirement
of notice.
The right of the record subject to challenge a summons or subpoena is severely
limited. It requires the customer to present factual evidence that the records being
sought are not being sought to obtain information relevant to a legitimate law
enforcement purpose. It is almost impossible to prove a negative and particularly
hard when the standard is so vague. Furthermore, placing this burden on the
customer flies in the face of the more traditional practice of making the State
establish its case first. This practice grew up early in our history from an understanding that the resources of the State substantially outweighed those of an
individual, and that the consequences to an individual of criminal prosecution
made it necessary to weight the protections of the judicial system in his favor.
The provision permitting the government agency to respond in camera to a
successful showing by a bank customer that the subpoena is invalid, makes it
impossible for the customer to learn the basis for denial of his claim. Here again,
the individual cannot assert his position adequately in the absence of critical
information-most likely information about himself.
Finally, [the PPSC was] concerned about the exemption of foreign intelligence
agencies from subpoena, notice, or other procedures, particularly because there
are no internal procedures required to determine the validity of requests, and no
requirements on record keepers to so much as to verify the identity of the requestor or the validity of the request.
1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 588-90 (statement of David L.
Linowes).
"' 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (additional statements).
tao 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (1978).
111
12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (1978).
ZIZ 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410 (1978).
113 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (1978).

FALL 1979]

Financial Privacy Act

45

and, even if the system is in need of reform, a banking act was
not the place to reform it. 254
Yet, by exempting grand jury process, the Act "pretend[s] the
grand jury is something other than it really is." 255 The grand jury
today is not an independent investigatory body subject to judicial
scrutiny but, rather a mere investigative auxilliary of the prosecutor. Historically, the grand jury's broad powers to investigate
alleged criminal conduct were justified only because they were
balanced by the traditional requirements of strict secrecy. Today,
secrecy with respect to recorded information has been eroded to
the point that government attorneys and investigators have ready
access to it. In essence, the grand jury subpoena may be little
more than an investigative tool used to circumvent the stringent
requirements of a search warrant. 258 Financial institutions are
currently required to deliver documents to government prosecutors without notice to customers either before of after delivery.
Unjustifiable invasions of privacy are just as likely or unlikely in
the context of a grand jury investigation as in any other law
enforcement investigation.
Nor are the arguments for exemption persuasive. If grand juries
are in need of reform, and especially if grand jury process is being
abused, it does not follow that grand jury process should be exempt from the basic safeguards of the Act. "Grand jury efforts
will not be unduly curtailed by requiring them to utilize one of
the procedures for access provided by Title XI. " 257
A second area of controversy concerns the new "non-coercive"
administrative procedure, the formal written request. 258 Critics
warned that this procedure provides access to all government
agencies who did not formerly have such power and gives all
government agencies an investigative arm. 259 One banker has estimated the Act opens access to approximately 140 administrative
n, See 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh); 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1 (statement of Russell
T. Baker); 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (statement of Benjamin
R. Civiletti).
,.. 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 585 (statement of Jeremiah
S. Gutman).
ZH 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S. 1460, supra note 4, at 590 (statement of David L.
Linowes). See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The record shows that
bank records obtained by Treasury agents may never have been presented to the grand
jury which was the only body with a legitimate right to see them.
217
Prussia letter, supra note 245, attachment A, at 5. Title XI is codified at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 3408 (1978).
w 12 U.S.C.A. § 3405 (1978). See note 248 and accompanying text supra .
.., 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 582 (statement of Jeremiah
S. Gutman), 588 (statement of David L. Linowes), & 637-38 (statement of James Brown).
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agencies. 280 The new procedure gives those agencies which do not
presently have statutory authority to issue administrative subpoenas or summonses the authority to acquire this power. Agencies may now promulgate rules governing the issuance of administrative summonses. 281 Until Title XI, Congress specifically failed
to give many agencies the powers of compulsory process. The Act
eliminates the distinction between those with and those without
such power, and gives investigatory power to all federal agencies.
If Congress deemed some agencies not sufficiently significant to
be given subpoena power, the Act's broad delegation of such authority is indefensible. 282
Law enforcement officials have defended the procedure, saying
it both provides privacy protection and does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 283 They maintain that it is subject to the
notice requirements and standing grants, and that it is "noncoercive," in the sense that an institution may refuse to honor the
request. 284 In practice, however, the ability of the institution to
decline to comply may be of limited value as privacy protection.
The statute 285 puts the financial institution in a difficult position.
Before it can comply, the institution must determine that: (1)
there is no administrative subpoena or summons authority available; (2) the request is authorized by regulations (and each
agency has its own internal regulations); and (3) there is reason
to believe the records sought are relevant to a law enforcement
inquiry. If it does comply and the agency did not have the required authority, the financial institution may be liable to the
customer for improper release of records. If a bank officer does not
comply, there may be serious conflicts within the institution because the institution may be subject to regulation by the very
agency seeking records of its customers. Institutions can be expected to comply regularly since compliance is the least challengeable way for an institution to insulate itself from liability.
The new form of access vests too much authority in administrative agencies. Agencies should not be permitted to determine
whether or not they need subpoena power. Each agency which

''° Lecture to the Banking Law Seminar by Harold J. Mortimer, Vice-President, First
National State Bankcorporation, at Rutgers Law School, Newark, New Jersey, April 3,
1979 .
.., 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408(2) (1978).
m 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (statements of David L. Linowes & Jeremiah S. Gutman).
m See generally 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statements of Richard
L. Thornburgh, Robert B. Fiske, Jr., & Samuel K. Skinner).
"'Id .
... 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (1978).
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wants such power should first be required to show the purposes
for which the information is sought. The broad authorization of
section 3408 should be repealed and Congress should decide on a
case-by-case basis which of the government authorities do, in
fact, need such power.
The customer challenge provisions 288 will probably generate the
greatest dissatisfaction to individuals. Customers who are notified that their records are being sought are likely to believe that
their privacy has been invaded. If they decide to challenge access,
they will find themselves forced into the difficult task of trying
to prove a negative. They will find that the grounds which they
may raise are limited to "relevancy" and "substantial compliance." Moreover, if they are successful in making the required
prima facie showing, they will find limited opportunity to obtain
information· about the inquiry because of the time constraints
(seven days for challenge proceedin_gs and the provision for an
in camera hearing).
The challenge procedure itself is also defective. A customer
must challenge government access by going to court. 287 Earlier
versions of the Act gave the customers the same right as if the
records were in his possession. 288 At that point the government
could go to court to demonstrate the reasonable relationship of
the ·record being sought to the law enforcement activity. The Act
now requires a customer challenging the government to file a
motion to quash the subpoena or summons or to file an application to enjoin the government from obtaining financial records
pursuant to a formal written request within fourteen days of the
mailing of the notice. 289 The motion must state why the records
are not relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry or in
what way the government has failed to comply with the statute. 270
Moreover, the customer must pay filing fees to challenge access. 271
Finally, the customer must make a prima facie showing that the
investigation is not undertaken for legitimate law enforcement
purposes or that the government has not substantially complied
with provisions of the Act. 272
It is unreasonable to require the customer to object by legal
action while the government is entitled to seek records by infor211

12 U.S.C.A. § 3410 (1978).
12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(e) (1978) .
... 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 9, 108, & 168.
211
12 U.S.C.A. § 3408(4)(B) (1978).
no 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978).
n, The fee recently went from $15.00 to $60.00. Legislation has been introduced to
reduce the fee to $5.00. 125 CoN. REc. H8645-46 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1979).
m U.S.C.A. § 3410(c) (1978).
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mal procedure rather than judicial subpoena. 273 The Act should
be amended so that the customer may simply file written objections to the agency's access to his financial records. The burden
would then be shifted to the government which would have to
demonstrate a legitimate need for information.
·
To challenge access, the customer has only two options. The
first is to attack the stated objective of the inquiry on its face. 274
That, however, will be almost impossible since "legitimate law
enforcement inquiry" is broadly defined. The agency can reply
that the objective is to find out whether or not a particular type
of transaction occurred and that it should not be compelled to
take the customer's word that it did not. The statute does not
require probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the records
will show a violation of law; mere relevance is all that need be
shown. 275 Furthermore, 12 U.S.C. § 3410(b), which permits the
government to respond to a successful showing in camera, makes
it impossible for the customer to learn the basis for denial of his
claim or to assert his position adequately. The statute should be
amended to require the government to make a showing that an
adversarial proceeding would be dangerous to an individual, or to
show similar compelling reasons.
The other approach for a customer who believes that a request
for records has an illegitimate objective is to charge
"discriminatory selectivity," i.e., that political, religious, or other
constitutionally protected activities led to the investigation, or
that the agency is discriminating on invidious grounds such as an
ethnic basis. The customer will have difficulty supporting charges
of selective discrimination in light of the seven day time limit on
challenges after the agency response is submitted. A customer
might ask the court to find the agency response inadequate, in
which case the agency would have to elect to give more information or allow the court to decide on the basis of the original response.
Former federal prosecutor Richard Givens believes some of the
tensions in the Act could be resolved by providing the customer
with a greater opportunity to acquire more information to challenge access. 276 Givens has suggested that since the difficulties
which confront a customer attempting to block access are formidable, increased attention should be given to false statements
21• 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 583 (statement of Jeremiah
S. Gutman).
210 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a)(2) (1978).
21• 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405(1), 3407(1), 3408(1), 3409(a)(2) (1978).
271 Givens, supra note 144, at 2.
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made by investigatory authorities in connection with access, as
both to initial assertions concerning the legitimacy and nature of
the investigation and to responses to customer challenges. 277 He
suggests three possible remedies: (1) criminal prosecution of officials involved where unlawful intent can be shown; (2) civil suits
for damages against the agency based on an inference that use of
false statements violates the Act (suits against individual officials
are prohibited); and (3) efforts to suppress the fruits of access
where false statements were utilized. 278 These "illegal fruits"
cases can be analogized to searches based on false affidavits filed
in support of search warrants. 279
The Act suffers from other weaknesses. State and local officials
are not covered-only federal law enforcement authorities are
subject to the Act. 280 There is no reason to believe inclusion of all
law enforcement officials in the Act will violate the principles of
federalism. The failure to include state and local authorities not
only creates a tremendous opportunity for abuse, but it inhibits
the growth of uniform rules for regulating government access to
financial information.
Presently, the Act permits state and local law enforcement
officials to be used as "sub-agents" of federal agencies. 281 Federal
officials can ask state authorities to obtain customer records
which are protected by the notice and standing requirements of
the Act. Those same records could be transferred by state officials
to federal investigators so as to avoid compliance with the Act.
Although this would appear to be a clear violation of the Act,
there is no statutory prohibition against the practice. While the
Act's definition of a financial record ("information known to be
derived from") 282 suggests such transfers would be illegal, this is
not enough. Language should be added to explicitly prohibit intergovernmental transfers of protected information. Furthermore,
criminal sanctions should be available as an alternate or addin, Id.
'" Id.
"' See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), in which the Court ruled that
where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement
knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth was included by the
affiant in support of a warrant, the defendant is entitled to a hearing. If at the hearing
the defendant is able to establish the alleged perjury or reckless disregard by a preponderance of the evidence and, with the false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining
content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the evidence must be excluded as fruits
of an illegal search.
280 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(3) (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (1978).
"' "[S]tate and local officials may act as tipsters and advise federal officials where to
look for information but federal agencies must still use the procedures to obtain the
information." FINANCIAL PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 21.
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(2) (1978).
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tional means to assure compliance. 283
Other criticisms of the Act include the delay of notice provision284 and the emergency access provision. 285 The broad language
in the former permits delayed notification for reasons that "would
otherwise seriously jeopardize an investigation or proceeding or
unduly delay a trial. " 288 Critics contend that this provision could
virtually negate the notice requirement. 287 On the other hand, the
emergency access provision is tied to a vague standard, namely,
"if the government authority determines." 288
Two of the Act's exceptions create different privacy threats.
Those are the intelligence exception and the SEC exception. The
intelligence exception is especially anachronistic in the postWatergate period. There is also no reason to except the SEC from
the notice and challenge provisions of the Act. The SEC is simply
another investigatory agency and should be subject to the Act's
provisions.
The Act as it applies to financial institutions fails to take them
out of that middle position between the legitimate needs of the
government and the customer's desire for confidentiality. Since
the government is not required to deliver a copy of the subpoena
or summons to the financial institution-a certificate of compliance is all that is required 289-the bank is unaware of what the
government has told the customer concerning the nature of the
investigation and the identity of the records. 290
Even if the institution would not be liable if it acted on the
good faith reliance of the certificate, the goodwill of the bank
which is so important to the banking business might be damaged.
Bankers traditionally have respected customer confidentiality
and point out that information once disclosed is no longer confidential. Moreover, the bank is never advised that a customer has
challenged access.
Title XI also puts unreasonable burdens on the financial institution. The responsibility for record-keeping and customer notifiw Givens, supra note 144, at 2.
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409 (1978) .
... 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b) (1978) .
... 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409(a)(3)(E) (1978).
••1 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 589 (additional statement
of David L. Linowes).
zu 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b)(l) (1978) .
.., 12 U.S.C.A. § 3411 (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3403(b) (1978).
no In contrast, the California Government Access to Financial Records Act, CAL. Gov'T
CODE §§ 7460-7490 (Deering 1976), recognizing the danger that the financial institution
could give the government too much information, requires law enforcement officials to
serve the bank with a copy of the subpoena or summons. See id. § 7470.
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cation is on the bank. 291 These record-keeping and notification
responsibilities should be on the government entity seeking the
information, not the financial institution. If the institution must
keep an examination record, the statute should be amended to
limit such retention to a reasonable period of time.
The Act also requires the financial institution to assemble the
records being sought by a federal agency. 292 Financial institutions
must assemble the records upon receipt of the request from the
government. 293 Time and money may be lost assembling documents which have been successfully challenged.
Another potential hazard is the provision which allows financial institutions to report information which they believe may be
relevant to a possible violation of law. 294 James Brown, a leading
consumer advocate, believes this provision compromises the financial institution's functional role as agent to the customer. 295
It undermines the individual's expectation of privacy in his dealings with his bank. It also places the financial institution in the
difficult role of discerning what may be illegal conduct, a task
for which it is unsuited and incompetent. Finally, the express
authorization might even encourage such reporting.
Title XI fails far short of its intended purpose. This legislation
arose because legislators rightfully perceived a need to curb government access to personal financial information, access without
notice to the customer and access that was not part of an appropriate law enforcement investigation. Unfortunately, the Act is
not an easy tool to be used by bank customers who perceive a
threat to their privacy. It is a complex obstacle course which the
individual must run in order to avoid government access to private information.
CONCLUSION

Customers consider their financial records private and they
expect their banks and other creditors to keep financial information confidential. United States v. Miller 296 held that this was not
a legitimate expectation and that a customer has no standing to
n, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3404(c), 3405, 3406, 3407, 3408 (1978). Although several of the cited
sections suggest that the government is responsible for notification, the reality of the
situation is that the bank takes on this burden since it is the bank which may be held
liable in a suit by an unnotified customer.
m 12 U.S.C.A. § 3411 (1978).
ni Id .
... 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 637 (additional statement
of James L. Brown).
115

/d .

... 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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assert a protectible interest in the information contained in financial records. The congressional response was the compromise
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978. 297 Congress rejected the
PPSC's recommendations for a new substantive right in financial
records and adopted procedural safeguards in an effort to meld
privacy interests with law enforcement needs. By providing procedural safeguards and nothing more, the Act superficially appears to provide privacy protection. Unfortunately, the Act fails
to give adequate protection.
Perhaps law enforcement would be inhibited if customers were
given a legal expectation of confidentiality in their records. The
price of such law enforcement efforts, however, is high. If the
government did not require banks to keep detailed personal data
on each customer, private information would not be in the possession of the third party record-keeper and customer privacy would
be protected. If law enforcement officials were limited by law as
to when they could use discretion, there would be fewer opportunities for abuse of authority. If legislators simplified or deleted the
record-keeping requirements and limited law enforcement authorities to the traditional tools of search warrants and probable
cause, both law enforcement and privacy needs would be met.
It is unlikely at present that either suggestion will be adopted.
As Congressman St. Germain said during the House of Representatives hearings, the 1978 Right to Financial Privacy Act is
"an elemental response" to the problem. 298 Unfortunately, the
contours of that problem are not yet clear.
217

12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (1978).
1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, at 1449 (statement of
Congressman Fernand J. St. Germain).
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